

16 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director

Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on
Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 0930 today in Mr. Block's office in "G" Building with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Capt. Karl Pechmann	- Navy Department
Comdr. David Enell	- Navy Department
Colonel Clyde High	- Air Force
Colonel William McNamee	- Army Department
[REDACTED]	- CIA

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2. Today's meeting was begun by asking Captain Pechmann to give a synopsis of his speech on psychological warfare which was delivered by him at Newport last week end. The Chairman complimented Captain Pechmann on what he termed must have been a splendid presentation.

3. Mr. Block said that some thoughts were running through his mind which he was hesitant to express, but that since they were connected with the Subcommittee's work, he felt that we should know about them. He referred to a recent meeting he had with Mr. Fred Ochsner who was the State Department member of the Working Group under NSC 4. Mr. Ochsner told Mr. Block that the opinion had been expressed at the Policy Committee meeting under NSC 4, that this Subcommittee would go out of existence when its organizational proposal was sent to SANACC.

4. These statements by Mr. Block gave rise to a full-fledged discussion of the relationship between the National Security Council and SANACC.

5. Mr. Block then stated that he was about to mention something which was quite "hush-hush." Namely, that Mr. George Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, had asked,

OSD & DOS review(s) completed.

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before his recent departure from Washington, that the work of this Subcommittee cease. The news of Mr. Kennan's request came to Mr. Block through Mr. Carlisle H. Hummelaine, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, and SANACC. When Mr. Block took the matter up with Mr. William Stone, Director of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange, Department of State, Mr. Stone told Mr. Block he should continue with his present Subcommittee operations realizing that Mr. Kennan has no direct control over this Subcommittee which has representation from other Agencies of the government besides the Department of State.

6. All of this type of discussion undoubtedly had a marked effect upon any concept of stability which the Subcommittee members might have had in their undertaking. I asked Mr. Block if the opinion expressed by the Policy Committee under NSC 4 was not very similar perhaps to the view he himself expressed about a week ago when he stated that his suggestion in time of war or threat of war would be to merge the functions of this Subcommittee, the Working Group under NSC 4 and the Special Committee of the JCS? His answer was that he was referring to what would happen in time of war or threat of war, and that he looked upon the mission of this Subcommittee as one which should continue and keep current by constant reworking and bringing up to date all the material it develops.

7. Mr. Block asked that the Navy member of the Subcommittee draft a written background for the organizational proposal so that we may have something to discuss for submittal to SANACC.

8. The next item on the agenda to be taken up tomorrow will be that of field organization. When this is finished, Mr. Block stated that the next item would be the problems of transition of the Subcommittee. Colonel Rich vehemently contested that he did not exactly know what was meant by the transition problems, since, in his estimation, the Subcommittee was now working on the type of organization for psychological warfare endeavors in time of war or threat of war. Mr. Block answered that transition problems referred not to the organization, but rather to the Subcommittee. I was inclined to agree with Colonel Rich's observations that a discussion of the transitional problems of the Subcommittee is somewhat of an unrealistic item. However, this matter will be taken up in due course.

9. Commander Broll recommended that the entire series of SANACC papers connected with psychological warfare be sent officially from SANACC to the National Security Council letting the NSC officially know of the existence of this Committee and its operations. Mr. Block stated that of course the most we could do was to make such a recommendation to SANACC and SANACC would have to decide whether a formal presentation should be made to the National Security Council.

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10. Colonel Rich observed that he was asked an important question which he would like to leave with the Subcommittee as they adjourn; viz., "What is the psychological warfare policy of the Nation?"

11. Colonel Halverson will attend the meeting tomorrow and, if there is no conflict with other activities, I will attend the meeting scheduled for Friday, 19 March 1978.

[Redacted]

ICAPS, Member

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cc: [Redacted]

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18 March 1948

DRAFTA ~~BASIC~~ PLAN FOR A NATIONAL WARTIME PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE ORGANIZATIONPROBLEM

To provide a ~~basic~~ plan for a National Wartime Psychological Warfare organization, *which may be used as a basis for further planning.*

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2 approved 29 April 1947, outlined the initial terms of reference of the Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations and stated the objectives related to psychological warfare.

SWNCC 304/6 approved 8 January 1948, ^{supplemented} ~~outlined~~ the foregoing considerations, outlined guiding principles essential to planning, and approved for implementation preliminary training projects.

Subsequent to the preparation of the foregoing papers, the Subcommittee has given special attention to resolving a ~~basic~~ plan for a national wartime organization for psychological warfare, *which may be used as a basis for further planning.*

CONCLUSIONS

Approval of SWNCC 304/6 held in abeyance the decision to establish a national psychological warfare ^{organization} ~~under~~ the National Security Council. In view of the authoritative control and coordination that such an organization will require, it is assumed that the National Security Council will eventually supervise the activities of such an ^{organization.} ~~agency through a director.~~

With the foregoing in mind the Subcommittee has prepared a ~~basic~~ plan for a national wartime psychological warfare organization. Subsequent to approval of the basic organization by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, the subcommittee will ^{develop further annexes to the} ~~give further study to a detailed description~~ the design of the proposed organization. ~~of the various subdivisions of the proposed basic organization.~~

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SECRETRECOMMENDATIONS*for Special Studies and Evaluations*

The Subcommittee recommends:

(a) that the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee approve enclosure, a ~~basic~~ plan for a national wartime psychological warfare organization.

(b) that the "cover" name of National Security Information Agency be tentatively approved for such an organization

(c) that this paper as approved be forwarded to the

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Army

Secretary of Navy

Secretary of Air Force

Joint Chiefs of Staff

National Security Council


Director Central Intelligence Agency

for information and appropriate action within the respective departments and agencies.

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E N C L O S U R E

A ~~Basic~~ PLAN FOR A NATIONAL WARTIME
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENCY



MISSION AND DUTIES OF THE
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AGENCY


MISSION: Subject to the ^{policy} ~~authority~~ and direction of the National Security Council it shall be the mission of the Director of NSIA to support national policy with psychological warfare.

- DUTIES:
1. To advise the National Security Council concerning psychological warfare.
 2. To coordinate the efforts of appropriate governmental departments and agencies and other supporting activities concerning psychological warfare.
 3. To develop policies and programs in support of national policy, plans and operations.
 4. To exercise general direction authority and control of NSIA and of such other facilities as are placed under his jurisdiction.
 5. To establish and maintain close liaison with the CIA.
 6. To communicate with theater commanders through the JCS only.

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AGENCY



Explanatory Notes:

ADVISORY BOARD

MISSION: To advise the Director on matters of broad policy concerning psychological warfare.

MEMBERSHIP:

Chairman: Director of Agency

Members: The following or their representatives:

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
 SECRETARY OF ARMY
 SECRETARY OF NAVY
 SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE
 DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INDIVIDUALS DESIGNATED BY PRESIDENT
 AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Advisers: Individual advisers, technical advisers, experts, and persons of similar status, consistent with security requirements.

Secretary: As designated by Director.

SECRETARIAT

1. Correspondence control
2. Documentation
3. Historian

GENERAL COUNSEL

1. Legal advice and guidance
2. Liaison

INSPECTION AND SECURITY

1. Security Control
2. ^{N.S.I} Agency censorship
3. Inspections and investigations
4. Liaison

STAFF COUNCIL


This council will coordinate and resolve internal problems. It will be composed of the Director, deputies of the agency subdivisions, representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency and others as required who are assigned to the agency to assist the Director in his duties.

Based on World War II experience estimate of required personnel requirements excluding outposts:

*TOTAL **
Officers 560
Staff 2140

** These estimates assume decentralization of activities to areas outside of Washington such as New York and San Francisco.*

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PLANS AND OPERATIONSExplanatory Notes:

For efficient operations this subdivision of the organization will have a minimum of two deputies, viz.,

- (a) Deputy for Domestic Operations
- (b) Deputy for Foreign Operations


It is the present intention that Domestic and Foreign Operations will be coordinated and administered in a single "Plans and Operations" subdivision, thereby preventing unnecessary duplication and waste of national effort.

Special Activities will have sole responsibility under the Director for covert psychological warfare.

Estimate of Initial
Personnel Requirements
for "Plans and Operations"

Officials 300
 Clerical Staff 1000

SERVICES



*Technical
Fig. 100*

Explanatory Notes:


The Deputy of Services will maintain close liaison with the supply and logistics divisions of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Forces.

To prevent duplication and waste, representatives of the supply and logistics divisions of the respective government departments will be assigned to this subdivision as required.

Estimate of Initial
Personnel Requirements
for "Services"

Officials 100
 Clerical Staff 1000

INTELLIGENCE



Explanatory Notes:

Intelligence is of paramount importance to the success of psychological warfare operations.

The agency will use established government intelligence activities to the ~~maximum~~ degree consistent with ~~efficient~~ operations; *efficiently*

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Close liaison will be established and maintained with the Central Intelligence Agency. *in liaison with the CIA, etc.*

In the course of psychological warfare operations significant ^{some of which may} information, not related to psychological warfare, ^{may} ~~in varying amounts~~ be acquired. Such information will be provided, ^{especially in the} to the Central Intelligence Agency ~~via the most expeditious means for evaluation.~~

Estimate of Initial Personnel Requirements for "Intelligence"

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Officials 60
Staff 40

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AGENCY

